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Abstract
We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance
of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find
both overdissipation relative to Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation in individual
subject efforts. In a 2× 2 design, we investigate the effects of sharing the prize proportionally and
of a convex cost function, while holding fixed the Nash equilibrium prediction for effort. We find
that the share rule results in average effort closer to the Nash prediction, lower variation in indi-
vidual efforts, and convergence of the distribution of individual efforts towards Nash over time.
Combining the share rule with a convex cost function further enhances these results. Our find-
ings indicate that a significant amount of subjects’ non-equilibrium behavior in contests can be
explained by features of the experimental design. These results contribute towards design guide-
lines for contests based on behavioral principles that take into account contest features that may
not affect the Nash equilibrium prediction.
These lessons suggest design guidelines for future experiments on contests.
JEL Classifications: C72, C91, D72
Keywords: rent-seeking, contest, contest design, experiments, quantal response, over-dissipation
Over-dissipation and convergence in rent-seeking experiments, rev May 2, 2012
1 Introduction
Overdissipation in rent-seeking contests (Tullock, 1980) is a robust result in the experimental lit-
erature. This phenomenon was first reported in experimental contest studies by Millner and Pratt
(1989, 1991) and has since been replicated by many other experiments, including, among others,
Davis and Reilly (1998), Potters et al. (1998), Lim et al. (2011), Sheremeta (2010a), Sheremeta
(2010b), Sheremeta (2011), and Sheremeta and Zhang (2010). Average effort levels in contests
exceed the Nash equilibrium prediction, in some cases by a wide enough margin that total ex-
penditure by all contest participants exceeds the value of the prize. Moreover, contrary to the
theoretical prediction of a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, experimental studies document
that individual efforts are distributed on the entire strategy space, and even aggregate individual
behavior is heterogeneous. We refer to this stylized fact as “overspreading.”
Over the last decade a number of studies have offered different explanations for overdissipa-
tion and overspreading in rent-seeking contests. Commonly cited explanations for overdissipation
are: (1) noise and errors (Schmidt et al., 2005; Lim et al., 2011; Sheremeta, 2011), (2) judg-
mental biases (Amaldoss and Rapoport, 2009; Sheremeta, 2011), (3) a non-monetary utility of
winning (Sheremeta, 2010a,b; Price and Sheremeta, 2011), and (4) evolutionary stable behavior
(Mago et al., 2012; Wa¨rneryd, 2012). Overspreading (substantial variation in individual behavior)
is usually attributed to heterogeneity in subjects’ preferences over factors such as (1) loss aversion
(Kong, 2008), (2) risk aversion (Sheremeta, 2011), (3) spitefulness (Herrman and Orzen, 2008),
and (4) preferences towards winning (Sheremeta, 2010a,b).
Although there are many studies investigating what factors can explain subjects’ non-equilibrium
behavior in contests, there are virtually no studies that investigate particular experimental design
features that may trigger such behavior. In a standard lottery contest, all players exert effort in
order to increase their probability of winning the prize. Higher efforts imply higher probability of
winning, but they are also more costly. In equilibrium, the marginal benefit of effort is equal to
the marginal cost. Therefore, a correct best-response computation requires experimental subjects
to assess correctly marginal benefit, which depends on the probability of winning, and marginal
cost, which depends on the convexity of the cost function. Any non-equilibrium behavior may
thus simply come as a consequence of a difficult computational task (Wright, 1980; Simon, 1992;
Rubenstein, 1998; Gigrenzer and Selten, 2001).
It has been well recognized, for example, that subjects possess distored perceptions of proba-
bilities, which may lead to non-equilibrium behavior. As a consequence, many alternative theories
have been proposed to account for such perceptions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Quiggin, 1982;
Chew, 1983; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Wilcox, 2011). Recent studies have tried to apply
some of these theories to explain subject behavior in contests and auctions (Goeree et al., 2002;
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Baharad and Nitzan, 2008; Amaldoss and Rapoport, 2009). However, even after accounting for in-
dividual perceptions of probabilities, the aggregate patterns of overdissipation and overspreading
lottery contests cannot be explained.1
Another explanation for why subjects’ behavior differs from theoretical predictions is based on
flatness of payoff functions (Harrison, 1989; Goeree et al., 2002; Georganas et al., 2011). Harrison
(1989), for instance, argues that overbidding in private value auctions relative to the Nash equilib-
rium may be due to the fact that the costs of such overbidding are rather small. By manipulating
the cost of overbidding in the first-price and second-price winner pay auctions, Goeree et al. (2002)
and Georganas et al. (2011) find support for this argument. Similarly, Mu¨ller and Schotter (2010)
find that subjects overbid in the private value all-pay contests when the cost of bid function is linear
but they actually underbid when the cost function is convex.
These findings suggest that there may be certain features of experimental design, such as cost
structure and prize sharing rules that influence individual behavior in contests. To test these hy-
potheses, we investigate the effects of sharing the prize proportionally and of a convex cost func-
tion in a 2× 2 design while holding fixed the Nash equilibrium. We find that in contests where the
prize is shared proportionally, average efforts are closer to the Nash equilibrium prediction, there
is lower variation in individual efforts, and efforts converge towards the Nash equilibrium over
time. A convex cost function enhances these results under the share rule; however, we find that
convex costs actually exacerbate overdissipation with probabilistic allocation, which we attribute
to knock-on effects driven by out-of-equilibrium play. These findings illustate the importance of
considering the behavioral drivers of out-of-equilibrium play for robust design of contests, and
provide some first results for guidance of contest design along these lines.
2 Theoretical background
We study a rent-seeking contest game following Tullock (1980). There are N players, indexed by
i. There is a prize, worth V > 0. Each player i simultaneously chooses an effort level ei ∈ [0, V ].
In a standard abuse of notation, we will write e−i =
∑
j 6=i ej to denote the sum of efforts of other
players. The cost of effort is given by a function c : R+ → R+, which we assume to be continuous,
monotonically increasing, and twice differentiable in effort. Irrespective of the outcome of the
contest, all players forgo the cost of effort.
1For example, Hillman and Katz (1984) and Skaperdas and Gan (1995) show that a simple assumption, as in Pratt
(1964), about risk aversion should lead to lower, not higher, aggregate efforts than risk neutrality.
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The contest success function is given by
pi(ei, e−i) =




This function can be interpreted as either the probability that player iwins the prize, if it is allocated
indivisibly to just one player, or the proportion of the prize awarded to player i. In either case, the
expected payoff to player i can be written as
E(pii) = piV − c(ei). (2)
When the prize is shared proportionally, there is no uncertainty in the outcome of the contest,
and this amounts to assuming that players maximize expected monetary payoffs. When the prize
is allocated via a lottery, this further assumes risk neutrality among players. Szidarovszky and
Okuguchi (1997) show the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium of this game, where the equi-





3 Experimental Design and Procedures
We implemented a two-dimensional factorial design. In one dimension, we varied the contest
success function, using the probabilistic (P ) or share (S) rules for awarding the prize. In the
second dimension, we varied the cost function, using the standard linear (L) cost function or a
convex (C) cost function. We therefore had four treatments, labeled PL, PC, SL, and SC.
In each treatment, we conducted 3 independent sessions. Sessions consisted of 12 participants,
who participated in 30 contests. Each session investigated only one treatment, so all comparisons
are across subjects. All sessions used student subjects at the Centre for Behavioural and Experi-
mental Social Science at University of East Anglia. The computerized experimental sessions were
run using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Participants were matched into groups of N = 4, with random anonymous rematching after
each contest. The value of the prize in all contests was V = 80 experimental francs. In each con-
test, participants simultaneously selected an effort level between 0 and 80. In sessions employing
the linear cost function, the cost of effort was c(e) = e. In sessions with the convex cost function,
the cost function c(e) = e
2
30
was used. Both cost functions lead to an equilibrium prediction for
effort of e? = 15. At the conclusion of the experiment, 5 of the 30 periods were chosen at random
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for payment. The earnings were converted into British pounds at the rate of 40 francs to £1. All
subjects also received a participation fee of £15 to cover potential losses. Subjects were informed
about the group size, prize value, and the cost structure. After each round, information on own and
group effort, win or loss outcome and own payoff in that round was provided.
In both the linear and convex cost treatments, the choice variable for participants was the
amount of effort, as opposed to the cost of effort. We made this decision to ensure comparabil-
ity of the strategy space between the treatments. We conveyed information about the relationship
between effort choices and costs by means of a table in the instructions2 enumerating each effort
choice and its corresponding cost. In the linear cost case, this device adds a small additional com-
plexity not present in most contest experiments, and, as participants only saw either the linear or
convex cost treatments, the use of such a table may have seemed unusual to participants in those
treatments. In our analysis we confirm that we replicate results from a previous contest experiment
to rule out the concern this device may have affected behaviour. In the convex cost case, the use of
the table device permitted participants, in principle, to make decisions either based on the amount
of effort to invest, or the amount of cost of effort. We therefore did not pursue a treatment in which
cost rather than effort was framed as the decision variable.
4 Results
Result 1. We replicate the main quantitative and qualitative findings of previous experiments using
the PL implementation. There is significant overdissipation, and effort levels are distributed across
the entire strategy space.
Support. Our baseline treatment PL involving linear costs and a probabilistic awarding of the full
surplus represents by far the most common implementation of the Tullock model in experimental
studies. To establish that we replicate the main results in this setting, we compare our data with
the data reported in Sheremeta (2010b), as the instructions and procedures used in both studies are
similar.3 The experiments differ in the subject pool (undergraduate students at Purdue University
in the United States versus students at the University of East Anglia in England) and the number
of experimental francs in the endowment and value of the prize (120 versus 80). The substantive
difference in our procedures was the use of an explicit table in the instructions summarizing the
cost of each level of effort.
[Figure 1 about here.]
2The instructions are available in Appendix A.
3Similar qualitative results on overdissipation and heterogeneity in behavior can be found in, for example, Davis
and Reilly (1998); Lim et al. (2011); Potters et al. (1998); Sheremeta (2010a, 2011); Sheremeta and Zhang (2010).
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Figure 1 sets the histogram of the chosen effort levels in our PL sessions against those in
Sheremeta (2010b), where we have renormalized all effort levels in Sheremeta (2010b)’s [0, 120]
interval onto our [0, 80] scale. We replicate the general qualitative shape of the distribution of
effort levels, most notably that the mode of the distribution occurs at effort levels near zero. Quan-
titatively, our data demonstrate slightly higher effort levels both in terms of means (26.2, versus
Sheremeta (2010b)’s 22.7) and medians (20 versus 15.3).
[Figure 2 about here.]
We now turn to comparing the baseline treatment PL to the other three treatments. Figure 2
displays the histograms of effort levels for each treatment. The histograms reveal that both factors
in the experimental design have a clear qualitative effect on the distribution of effort choices. Sub-
jects do respond both to changes in the allocation rule and changes in the cost structure, indicating
both are taken into account in the subjects’ decision-making processes.
[Table 1 about here.]
Table 1 displays summary statistics on the distribution of efforts by treatment. At the level
of point estimates of the location parameters (mean and median), the share rule has the expected
effect: efforts decrease on average under the share rule both with linear and convex costs. The
treatment effect of using the convex cost structure relative to linear is not as clear. With the share
rule, convex costs decrease mean and median effort levels; however, with the probability rule,
convex costs appear to increase the mean and median effort level. As expected, convex costs
reduce dispersion in effort.
[Figure 3 about here.]
The average costs of effort in Table 1 imply that on average participants were making losses in
PL, PC, and SL. As this implies that there were opportunties in the experiment for participants to
significantly increase their earnings, a next question is whether there is any evidence of a change
in behavior based on experience over time in the experiment. Figure 3 displays the time series of
average effort levels for each of the four treatments. There is an impression of modest decreases
in the average effort over time, but not of strong convergence towards the equilibrium prediction.
In addition, the ordering of the treatments from Table 1 in terms of average efforts is observed, in
general, throughout the experiment.
We formalize the analysis of treatment effects and time trends on average dissipation levels by
estimating a panel regression model
oit = eit − 15 = β0 + β1P + β2C + β3t+ ui + εit. (4)
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The dependent variable, oit, is the overdissipation relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction. We
include indicator variables for whether the probability rule is employed, P = 1, and whether the
convex cost structure is employed, C = 1. We use a random-effects error structure by subject, to
account for the multiple decisions made by individual subjects. Standard errors are clustered at the
session level to account for session effects.
[Table 2 about here.]
Table 2 reports the estimation results of the models. We report five specifications. Specification
(1) pools all available data. Specifications (2) through (5) focus on comparing treatment pairs
which differ only in one dimension. Based on these regressions, we can formally support the
following results on average overdissipation levels.
Result 2. The share rule significantly reduces average overdissipation when using convex costs.
When using linear costs, the share and probability rules are not significantly different.
Support. In specification (2) comparing PC and SC, average overdissipation is higher by 11.27
in PC. This is significant at the 1% level. Further, in magnitudes, SC exceeds the equilibrium
prediction by only 5.63; PC is three times farther, in effort choice terms, from the equilibrium.
Turning to specification (3), average overdissipation is 3.19 higher in PL than SL, although the
difference is not statistically significant. It is also small relative to the baseline overdissipation of
12.34 in SL.
Result 3. When using the share rule, overdissipation is significantly lower with convex costs.
When using the probability rule, the difference between linear and convex costs is not significantly
different.
Support. In specification (5) comparing SC and SL, convex costs significantly decrease effort
levels, with overdissipation in SC being only 43% of that in SL. This result is intuitive given
that the convex cost function provides sharper incentives against high effort levels. Comparing
the probability rule treatments PC and PL, however, the direction of the comparison goes the
other way. The average efforts are higher with convex costs, although the size of the effect is not
statistically significant and is relatively small compared to the baseline overdissipation observed in
PL.
Result 4. There is evidence of learning and adjustment over time towards lower overdissipation
in all treatments at the aggregate level.
Support. In all five regression model specifications, we find that the coefficient on the period
number is negative in sign, statistically significant at the 1% level, and consistent in magnitude,
ranging from -0.19 to -0.28.
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While the aggregate effects are indeed relevant, the more striking feature of Figure 2 is that it
reveals that qualitative properties of the distribution of efforts vary across treatments. In all cases,
we replicate the stylized fact that the point prediction of Nash equilibrium does not capture the
richness of observed behavior. We now turn to understanding more closely the mechanisms that
generate these effort distributions, which in turn ultimately determine the aggregate performance
of the contests.
Figure 2 pooled all effort choices of all subjects across all sessions for each treatment. Based
on the results of the regressions in Table 2, on aggregate there is some evidence of learning and
adjustment over time. To focus on behavior after subjects have had a chance to understand the rules
of the game and anticipate the possible behavior of others in their cohort, we look at the second
half of the experiment (periods 16 through 30). Furthermore, we are interested in decomposing
how much of the variation in efforts is across subjects versus within subjects.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Figure 4 presents, for each subject in each treatment, a boxplot capturing the distribution of
effort choices over the last half of the experiment. Subjects are ordered by increasing median
effort choices, which are indicated by diamonds. Therefore, by focusing on the diamonds, one
can read off the cumulative empirical distribution of the median choices across subjects, while by
focusing on the boxplots themselves, one can get a sense of the degree of within-subject variation
in behavior.
Result 5. The share rule reduces variability both within subjects and across subjects.
Support. First comparing PL and SL and focusing on across-subjects variability, the distribution
of median choices crosses the equilibrium value of 15 at the same point. On either side, the
distribution of medians in SL is closer to the equilibrium value than in PL. Comparing PC with
SC the effect is even more striking; almost all subjects in SC have median choices within 5 units of
effort of the equilibrium, while in PC the median effort choices are distributed across the strategy
set.
Within-subjects, in both the linear and convex cases, the size of the boxes for subjects tend
to be smaller in SL than PL and SC than PC, with again the effect being most striking when
comparing PC and SC.
Result 6. Variability both within subjects and across subjects is smaller with convex costs than
with linear costs.
Support. First comparing SL and SC, it is clear that median efforts cluster more closely to the
equilibrium value in SC than SL, and that the amount of variability within subjects is much smaller
in SC.
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Comparing PL and PC, the distribution of median efforts is less dispersed in the convex
cost treatment. Within-subject variation is also less prominent in PC. What distinguishes the
probability rule from the share rule, and begins to shed light on the unexpected comparative static
on mean overdissipation between PL and PC, is the location in the strategy space where PC
gathers effort choices. Rather than gathering relatively close to Nash, as in SC, in PC most
subjects settle on efforts in between 20 and 30. Further, this cadre of subjects with median choices
in [20, 30] in PC also exhibit the least variability in effort levels in that treatment. That is to say, it
is not the case that these subjects have median effort levels in that range because they are exploring
the full strategy space or picking at random.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Nash equilibrium predictions rest crucially on the assumptions that players have correct be-
liefs about the distributions of strategy choices, and, given these beliefs, choose responses which
maximize their own payoffs. The nondegenerate distributions of effort levels observed in contests
provide prima facie evidence that indeed subjects are not best-responding expected-earnings max-
imizers who have correct beliefs about the behavior of other participants in their cohort. While
our rejection of point predictions of Nash equilibrium is neither novel nor surprising, our design
allows us to look more closely at the Nash equilibrium assumptions to infer whether and how they
fail.
In our design, subjects get feedback about the overall spending in their group in each period.
Therefore, we begin by supposing that subjects have at least an approximate sense of the distribu-
tion of effort levels being chosen, therefore retaining the correct beliefs assumption, while relaxing
the assumption of expected earnings maximization. One commonly-used model which captures
these assumptions is the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). In
a QRE, a player evaluates the expected payoff of each strategy choice inclusive of an additive noise
term. We follow the standard in random-utility models by using the logit form of QRE. This form
has one free parameter, λ ∈ [0,∞), which is a precision parameter; larger values of λ correspond
to a smaller variance in the noise term in payoff evaluation.
To take logit QRE to the data, we first again focus on the last 15 periods of the experiment, both
because QRE assumes players have accurate beliefs about the play of others, and because we treat
QRE as a static concept, so we avoid a confound with any early-period learning and adjustment.
We estimate λ by maximum likelihood, pooling across all subjects across all sessions.4 Figure 5
displays the QRE fits superimposed over the histogram of choices, and reports the corresponding
values of λ for each.
4As in all logit models, λ is cardinal, having units equal to the unit of measurement of payoffs. To facilitate
comparison with other papers reporting logit QRE estimates, we express λ in units of US dollars, using the exchange
rate £1 = $1.60 in force at the time of the experiments.
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Result 7. Logit QRE organizes behavior in share rule treatments well, particularly in conjunction
with convex costs.
Support. The QRE fit for SC has λ = 2.488, which indicates a high degree of precision in best
responses.5 The qualitative fit of the distribution is in very close agreement with the data. The SL
fit also tracks the qualitative distribution of the data; the estimated λ = 0.807 remains modestly
higher than previously-reported figures. The one feature QRE does not account for is the frequency
of choices of 80 in SL. Almost all of these observations arise from one subject (see Figure 4).6
Since in our design information about the play of other participants is the same between the
probability (PL and PC) and share (SL and SC) treatments, the inferior performance of QRE
in the probability rule treatments cannot be attributed to incorrect beliefs about others’ play, per
se. However, a further implication of the share rule is that feedback about payoff implications
of behavior is received without noise, whereas payoffs in the probability rule have a substantial
random component. Determining an expected-earnings maximizing best response is more difficult
under the probability rule. It is also possible that share rule treatments result in more consistent
behavior because share rule eliminates several motivations that may enter into decision-making
heuristics of participants in probability rule treatments, such as risk, loss aversion and a motivation
to “win” the contest.
The QRE performs even better when we further introduce convex costs. As illustrated in the
distributions of Figure 4 convex costs eliminate many of the very aggressive effort choices com-
pared to linear treatments. This is not surprising, since the introduction of the convex cost structure
implies that any effort level above 49 necessarily results in negative earnings, even if the contest
is won. The effect of convex costs is especially strong when comparing treatments SL and SC.
However, when comparing treatments PL and PC, convex costs have two effects. On the one
hand, convex costs eliminate high effort choices, but on the other hand, this has a knock-on strate-
gic effect; as the most aggressive effort choices are reined in, it now becomes more attractive in
payoff terms to choose higher effort levels. Therefore, while in PL 8 of the 36 subjects have me-
dian choices below 1, meaning they choose not to enter the contest a majority of the time, similar
behavior is not observed in PC. Instead, most participants make effort choices in the interval be-
tween 20 and 30. In PC, the breakeven strategy, measured against the empirical distribution of
effort levels, is 24. Therefore, the cluster of subjects in PC in the interval between 20 and 30 are,
to a first approximation, playing the strategy which maximizes their chances of winning subject to
breaking even on average.
5For comparison, Lim et al. (2011) report λ ≈ 0.57 for four-player contests, also using US dollars as the unit.
6Augmenting the QRE model to incorporate a different behavioral type which always chooses 80 does not change
the conclusions significantly.
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5 Discussion
Experimental studies of lottery contests find both overdissipation and overspreading. A number of
studies suggest that overdissipation in contests can be explained by noise and errors, judgmental
biases, a non-monetary utility of winning, and an evolutionary stable behavior. Overspreading
is usually attributed to subjects heterogeneous preferences towards losses, risk, spitefulness, and
preferences towards winning.
In this study, we show how features of the contest environment which do not change the Nash
equilibrium prediction nevertheless have significant implications for both overdissipation and over-
spreading in the contest. Specifically, in a two-by-two design, we investigate the effects of sharing
the prize proportionally and of a convex cost function, while holding fixed the Nash equilibrium.
We find that the share rule results in average efforts closer to the Nash prediction, lower variation
in individual efforts, and convergence of the distribution of individual efforts towards Nash over
time. Combining the share rule with a convex cost function further enhances these results.
The findings of our study can explain several puzzles in the literature. First, experimental
studies on rank-order tournaments (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) find that there is almost no overdis-
sipation and average efforts are usually consistent with Nash equilibrium (Bull et al., 1987). This
is in sharp contrast to the findings from lottery contests.7 Our results suggest that this disparity
can be explained by the fact that experiments on rank-order tournaments employ convex cost of
effort – which, in that setting, is often needed to obtain a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies –
while experiments on lottery contests employ linear cost of effort. Specifically, we find significant
overdissipation with linear costs (as in most experiments on lottery contests) but it disappears when
costs are convex.
The current results also help to clarify why a subset of studies on rent-seeking contests, in-
cluding Shogren and Baik (1991), Baik et al. (1999), and Linster et al. (2001) find little to no
overdissipation. While the majority of experimental studies employ lottery rule to determine the
winner of the contest (Sheremeta et al., 2012), the three aforementioned studies employ a share
rule. For example, Shogren and Baik (1991) employ the share rule and find that subjects learn to
play Nash equilibrium in the final periods of the experiment. The results of our experiment show
that the share rule results in average efforts closer to the Nash equilibrium prediction, while the
probability rule results in overdissipation.
Some contest settings arise naturally and are not amenable to design in the implementation of
the prize allocation or cost rules. When design is possible, our results provide guidance on de-
sign from behavioral principles. The experimental literature has shown that behavior in games can
vary as a function of design parameters, even when the Nash equilibrium is independent of those
7For a review see Sheremeta et al. (2012).
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parameters (see the elegant review of Goeree and Holt (2001) for a selection of examples). In
contests with the probability rule and linear costs, behavior does not appear to be well-organized
by equilibrium, even in a model which admits individual heterogeneity in preferences. Effective
design of a contest game in which behavior in the baseline is inconsistent with equilibrium requires
an understanding of the drivers of non-equilibrium play. Our results in the PC treatment illustrate
this. An obvious hypothesis would be that making very aggressive effort choices prohibitively ex-
pensive would rein in aggressive play, and, indeed, this is observed in our data. But there appears
to be a knock-on effect at work: by eliminating this aggressive play, entry into the contest becomes
more attractive; participants who might otherwise sit out a contest in the face of aggressive coplay-
ers now find it worthwhile to choose positive levels of effort. These effects operate in opposite
directions, and in our data we find that the effect of increased participation is at least that of the
reined-in aggressive players. Our results, then, illustrate that work on design in contests, in the lab
and the field, should be informed by an account of the determinants of (non-equilibrium) behavior.
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A Instructions (not for publication)
We present as a baseline the instructions for convex costs with each rule. Relative to these instruc-




This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision making. Various research agencies
have provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple. If you follow them closely and
make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money.
The currency used in the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to British Pounds at
a rate of 20 francs to 1 pound. You have already received a £15.00 participation fee. At the
end of todays experiment, you will be paid in private and in cash. 12 participants are in todays
experiment.
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It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other peoples work. If you have
any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will
come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not
be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
YOUR DECISION
The experiment consists of 30 decision-making periods. At the beginning of each period, you will
be randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 4 participants. The composition of your
group will be changed randomly every period. Each period, you may bid for an 80 francs reward.
You may bid any number between 0 and 80 (including 0.1 decimal points). An example of your
decision screen is shown below.
YOUR EARNINGS
For each bid there is an associated cost. A table is attached to these instructions: each possible bid
is given in column A, and its cost is given in column B. Note that as bids rise from 0 to 80, costs
rise. The cost of a bid can be also calculated using the following formula:




The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive the reward. The more the other participants
in your group bid, the less likely you are to receive the reward. Specifically, your chance of
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receiving the reward is given by your bid divided by the sum of all 4 bids in your group:
Chance of receiving the reward =
Your bid
Sum of all 4 bids in your group
.
You can consider the amounts of the bids to be equivalent to numbers of lottery tickets. The
computer will draw one ticket from those entered by you and the other participants, and assign the
reward to one of the participants through a random draw. If you receive the reward, your earnings
for the period are equal to the reward of 80 francs minus the cost of your bid. If you do not receive
the reward, your earnings for the period are equal to 0 francs minus the cost of your bid. In other
words, your earnings are:
If you receive the award: Earnings = Reward - Cost of your bid = 80 - Cost of your bid
If you do not receive the award: Earnings = 0 - Cost of your bid
AN EXAMPLE
Lets say participant 1 bids 10 francs, participant 2 bids 15 francs, participant 3 bids 0 francs, and
participant 4 bids 40 francs. Therefore, the computer assigns 10 lottery tickets to participant 1, 15
lottery tickets to participant 2, 0 lottery tickets to participant 3, and 40 lottery tickets for participant
4. Then the computer randomly draws one lottery ticket out of 65 (10 + 15 + 0 + 40). As you can
see, participant 4 has the highest chance of receiving the reward: 0.62 = 40/65. Participant 1 has
a 0.15 = 10/65 chance, participant 2 has a 0.23 = 15/65 chance, and participant 3 has a 0 = 0/65
chance of receiving the reward.
Assume that the computer assigns the reward to participant 4, then the earnings of participant
4 for the period are 26.67 = 80 - 53.33, since the reward is 80 francs and the cost of bid of 40 is
53.33 as shown on your Cost of Bid table. Similarly, the earnings of participant 1 are -3.33 = 0 -
3.33, participant 2 are -7.5 = 0 - 7.5, and participant 3 are 0 = 0 - 0.
At the end of each period, your bid, the sum of all 4 bids in your group, your reward, the
cost of your bid, and your earnings for the period are reported on the outcome screen as shown
below. Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your
Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate heading.
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IMPORTANT NOTES
You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which group. At the
beginning of each period you will be randomly re-grouped with other three participants to form a
4-person group.
For calculation purposes, you can use the “Calculator” button at the lower left side of your
screen. A calculator will appear in your screen after clicking the button.
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 5 of the 30 periods for actual payment
for this experiment using a computer program. You will sum the total earnings for these 5 periods
and convert them to a British pound payment.
Are there any questions?
SC treatment
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision making. Various research agencies
have provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple. If you follow them closely and
make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money.
The currency used in the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to British Pounds at
a rate of 20 francs to 1 pound. You have already received a £15.00 participation fee. At the
end of todays experiment, you will be paid in private and in cash. 12 participants are in todays
experiment.
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other peoples work. If you have
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any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will
come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not
be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
YOUR DECISION
The experiment consists of 30 decision-making periods. At the beginning of each period, you will
be randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 4 participants. The composition of your
group will be changed randomly every period. Each period, you may bid for a share of an 80
francs reward. You may bid any number between 0 and 80 (including 0.1 decimal points). An
example of your decision screen is shown below.
YOUR EARNINGS
For each bid there is an associated cost. A table is attached to these instructions: each possible bid
is given in column A, and its cost is given in column B. Note that as bids rise from 0 to 80, costs
rise. The cost of a bid can be also calculated using the following formula:




The more you bid, the higher is your share of the reward. The more the other participants in
your group bid, the lower is your share of the reward. Specifically, the computer will allocate to
you a share of the 80 francs reward according to your share of the sum of all 4 bids in your group.
In other words, your share is:
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Share = 80× Your bid
Sum of all 4 bids in your group
Your earnings for the preiod are equal to the share of the 80 francs reward minus the cost of
your bid. In other words, your earnings are:
Earnings = Share - cost of your bid
AN EXAMPLE
Lets say participant 1 bids 10 francs, participant 2 bids 15 francs, participant 3 bids 0 francs, and
participant 4 bids 40 francs. Then the sum of all 4 bids is 65 (10 + 15 + 0 + 40). As you can
see, participant 4 receives the highest share of 80 francs reward: 49.2 = 80×40/65. Participant 1
receives a share of 12.3 = 80×10/65, participant 2 receives 18.5 = 80×15/65, and participant 3
receives 0 = 80×0/65.
The earnings of participant 1 for the period are 8.97 = 12.3 - 3.33, since the share of the reward
is 12.3 and the cost of bid of 10 is 3.33 as shown on your Cost of Bid table. Similarly, the earnings
of participant 2 are 11 = 18.5 - 7.5, participant 3 are 0 = 0 - 0, and participant 4 are -4.1 = 49.2 -
53.33.
At the end of each period, your bid, the sum of all 4 bids in your group, your share, the
cost of your bid, and your earnings for the period are reported on the outcome screen as shown
below. Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your
Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate heading.
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Cost table (common to both treatments)
Table – Cost of Bid 
Column A Column B  Column A Column B  Column A Column B
Bid Cost of Bid  Bid Cost of Bid  Bid Cost of Bid
0 0.00  30 30.00  60 120.00
1 0.03 31 32.03 61 124.03
2 0.13 32 34.13 62 128.13
3 0.30 33 36.30 63 132.30
4 0.53 34 38.53 64 136.53
5 0.83 35 40.83 65 140.83
6 1.20 36 43.20 66 145.20
7 1.63 37 45.63 67 149.63
8 2.13 38 48.13 68 154.13
9 2.70 39 50.70 69 158.70
10 3.33 40 53.33 70 163.33
11 4.03 41 56.03 71 168.03
12 4.80 42 58.80 72 172.80
13 5.63 43 61.63 73 177.63
14 6.53 44 64.53 74 182.53
15 7.50 45 67.50 75 187.50
16 8.53 46 70.53 76 192.53
17 9.63 47 73.63 77 197.63
18 10.80 48 76.80 78 202.80
19 12.03 49 80.03 79 208.03
20 13.33 50 83.33 80 213.33
21 14.70 51 86.70
22 16.13 52 90.13
23 17.63 53 93.63
24 19.20 54 97.20
25 20.83 55 100.83
26 22.53 56 104.53
27 24.30 57 108.30
28 26.13 58 112.13
29 28.03  59 116.03    
4
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Figure 1: Comparison of the baseline treatment to previously-published data. Effort levels in
Sheremeta (GEB 2010) rescaled to match the range in the present experiments. The baseline
treatment replicates the standard stylized facts about the level and distribution of effort choices.
22










































































0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Effort
(d) SC
Figure 2: Distribution of effort choices for each of the four treatments, all periods.
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Figure 3: Average efforts over time, by treatment
24
Over-dissipation and convergence in rent-seeking experiments, rev May 2, 2012




























































































































































Figure 4: Boxplot of effort choices by subject, last 15 rounds. Subjects are sorted in increasing
order by median effort, which are indicated by diamonds. The vertical line at an effort of 15 marks
the Nash equilibrium prediction.
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(a) PL (b) SL
(c) PC (d) SC
Figure 5: Logit quantal response equilibrium fits to empirical distribution of effort choices, last 15
rounds.
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Linear Convex
Effort Nash PL SL Nash PC SC
Mean 15.0 26.2 23.0 15.0 29.0 17.7
Median 15.0 20.0 17.5 15.0 26.0 16.3
SD 0.0 24.1 20.0 0.0 18.6 8.6
Linear Convex
Cost Nash PL SL Nash PC SC
Mean 15.0 26.2 23.0 7.5 39.4 12.9
Median 15.0 20.0 17.5 7.5 22.5 8.8
SD 0.0 24.1 20.0 0.0 48.0 19.9
Table 1: Summary statistics on effort and cost for each of the four treatments
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Dependent variable, oit = eit − 15 All PC and SC PL and SL PC and PL SC and SL
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
P (probability) 7.23*** 11.27*** 3.19
(1 if probability and 0 if share) (2.18) (1.89) (3.29)
C (convex costs) -1.25 2.79 -5.29***
(1 if convex and 0 if linear) (2.18) (3.16) (2.10)
period -0.24*** -0.19*** -0.28*** -0.20*** -0.27***
(period trend) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07)
constant 9.61*** 5.63*** 12.34*** 14.23*** 12.22***
(2.48) (0.99) (2.81) (3.44) (2.71)
Observations 4320 2160 2160 2160 2160
Table 2: Panel estimation of treatment effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** indi-
cates significance at the 1% level. All models included a random effects error structure, with the
individual subject as the random effect, to account for the multiple decisions made by individual
subjects. The standard errors were clustered at the session level to account for the session effects.
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